

Tweaks on Grøstl

<http://www.groestl.info>

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1 Introduction

Grøstl is a candidate in the SHA-3 hash function competition, and it was recently selected as one of the five finalists in the competition. Upon this selection, we have decided to make a few simple changes to the constants of the hash algorithm in order to increase its security margin without penalizing its speed. This document describes the changes. From now on, the original version of **Grøstl** shall be called **Grøstl-0**. In other words, **Grøstl** refers to the tweaked version.

In this note, we reuse the notation of the original submission document [1]. We recall here, however, that the **Grøstl** compression function is defined as

$$f(h, m) = P(h \oplus m) \oplus Q(m) \oplus h,$$

where P and Q are two different permutations. For the small variants of **Grøstl** (returning a hash value of length up to 256 bits), we assign the index 512 to these permutations (since they operate on 512-bit values), and for the large variants (returning hash values from 264 up to 512 bits), we assign the index 1024.

2 Tweaks

The general purpose of the tweaks is to make the permutations P and Q used inside the **Grøstl** compression function more different. This is achieved in two manners:

1. by changing the shift values used in the permutation Q , and

2. by using “bigger” round constants in P and Q .

We describe the changes on the 512-bit permutations and on the 1024-bit permutations separately.

2.1 512-bit permutations (Grøst1-224/256)

Recall that the 512-bit permutations are used in all Grøst1 variants returning up to 256 bits. Since output sizes of 224 and 256 bits are the most relevant ones, we collectively denote all these Grøst1 variants by Grøst1-224/256.

2.1.1 New Shift Values

In the original version Grøst1-0-224/256, the transformation ShiftBytes was used in both P_{512} and Q_{512} . In the new version of Grøst1, we introduce different ShiftBytes values to be used in Q_{512} . The ShiftBytes values in P_{512} are kept the same. ShiftBytes moves all bytes in row i of the state matrix by σ_i positions to the left. Then, the new vector σ of Q_{512} is given as follows (Grøst1-0: $\sigma = [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]$):

$$Q_{512} : \quad \sigma = [1, 3, 5, 7, 0, 2, 4, 6]$$

These new shift values are also shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1: The transformation ShiftBytes of permutation Q_{512} .

2.1.2 New Round Constants

In the original version Grøst1-0-224/256, the round constants $C[i]$ of P_{512} and Q_{512} used in the transformation AddRoundConstant in round i were sparse with only a single byte value different from zero.

In the tweaked Grøst1-224/256, we increase the round constants to the following values:

$$P_{512} : C[i] = \begin{bmatrix} 00 \oplus i & 10 \oplus i & 20 \oplus i & 30 \oplus i & 40 \oplus i & 50 \oplus i & 60 \oplus i & 70 \oplus i \\ 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 \\ 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 \\ 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 \\ 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 \\ 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 \\ 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 \\ 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 \end{bmatrix}$$

and

$$Q_{512} : C[i] = \begin{bmatrix} ff & ff \\ ff & ff \\ ff & ff \\ ff & ff \\ ff & ff \\ ff & ff \\ ff \oplus i & ef \oplus i & df \oplus i & cf \oplus i & bf \oplus i & af \oplus i & 9f \oplus i & 8f \oplus i \end{bmatrix}$$

where i is the round number viewed as an 8-bit value, and all other values are written in hexadecimal notation.

We note that the XOR with ff in Q_{512} can be viewed as the application of a different S-box, and hence it can be implemented as a new S-box table if desired.

2.2 1024-bit permutations (Grøstl-384/512)

Recall that the 1024-bit permutations are used in all Grøstl variants returning from 264 up to 512 bits. Since output sizes of 384 and 512 bits are the most relevant ones, we collectively denote all these Grøstl variants by Grøstl-384/512.

2.2.1 New Shift Values

In the original version Grøstl-0-384/512, the same transformation ShiftBytesWide was used in both permutations P_{1024} and Q_{1024} . In the new version of Grøstl, we use different constant values in the ShiftBytesWide transformation of permutation Q_{1024} . The ShiftBytesWide values in P_{512} are kept the same. The new vector σ of Q_{1024} is given as follows (Grøstl-0: $\sigma = [0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 11]$):

$$Q_{1024} : \sigma = [1, 3, 5, 11, 0, 2, 4, 6]$$

These new shift values are also shown in Figure 2.




Figure 2: The ShiftBytesWide_Q transformation.

2.2.2 New Round Constants

In the original version Grøstl-0-384/512, the round constants $C[i]$ of P_{1024} and Q_{1024} used in the transformation AddRoundConstant in round i were sparse with only a single byte value different

from zero.

In the tweaked `Grøstl-384/512`, we increase the round constants to the following values:

$$P_{1024} : C[i] = \begin{bmatrix} 00 \oplus i & 10 \oplus i & 20 \oplus i & 30 \oplus i & 40 \oplus i & 50 \oplus i & 60 \oplus i & 70 \oplus i & 80 \oplus i & \dots & f0 \oplus i \\ 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & \dots & 00 \\ 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & \dots & 00 \\ 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & \dots & 00 \\ 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & \dots & 00 \\ 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & \dots & 00 \\ 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & \dots & 00 \\ 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & 00 & \dots & 00 \end{bmatrix}$$

and

$$Q_{1024} : C[i] = \begin{bmatrix} ff & \dots & ff \\ ff & \dots & ff \\ ff & \dots & ff \\ ff & \dots & ff \\ ff & \dots & ff \\ ff & \dots & ff \\ ff & \dots & ff \\ ff \oplus i & ef \oplus i & df \oplus i & cf \oplus i & bf \oplus i & af \oplus i & 9f \oplus i & 8f \oplus i & 7f \oplus i & \dots & 0f \oplus i \end{bmatrix}$$

where i is the round number viewed as an 8-bit value, and all other values are written in hexadecimal notation.

3 Rationale for the Choice of Tweaks

`Grøstl` has received a large amount of cryptanalytic attention since it was submitted to the SHA-3 competition. Although there is no full cryptanalysis of the `Grøstl` hash functions, a possible conclusion from the published results is that the security of `Grøstl` would benefit from the permutations P and Q being more different. Therefore, we decided to make the described simple tweaks.

The change of shift values in Q means that differences propagate differently in P and Q . Some cryptanalysis of the previous version of `Grøstl` [2, 4–6, 8] has exploited the fact that by introducing a (truncated) difference in the input m , there is a relatively good probability that these differences propagate in the same way in P and Q , meaning that the output differences of P and Q may cancel each other. We have changed the shift values in Q such that no row is shifted by the same amount as in P , and such that the resulting states in P and Q are not simply shifted versions of each other. This way, it becomes much more difficult to ensure that output differences in P and Q may cancel each other.

Another type of cryptanalysis traces differences between P and Q , instead of the more traditional tracing of differences between pairs of inputs to a function [7]. This method has in particular been used in a collision attack on a reduced-round version of the `Grøstl-0` hash function [3], and in the distinguishing attacks on the compression function [7] of `Grøstl-0`. By making the round constants different in all byte positions of the states of P and Q , these attacks are thwarted.

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